MILNE, LIQUIDATOR OF PREMIER HOUSEWARES (SCOTLAND) LLP AGAINST NAEEM RASHID [2018] ScotCS CSOH

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	Scottish Court of Session Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> MILNE, LIQUIDATOR OF PREMIER HOUSEWARES (SCOTLAND) LLP AGAINST NAEEM RASHID [2018] ScotCS CSOH_23 (14 March 2018) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2018/[2018]_CSOH_23.html Cite as: [2018] ScotCS CSOH_23, [2018] CSOH 23

BRIAN WILLIAM MILNE, LIQUIDATOR OF PREMIER HOUSEWARES (SCOTLAND) LLP

[1] The noter is the liquidator of Premier Housewares (Scotland) LLP (“the LLP”). The

respondent was a member of the LLP. A winding-up order in respect of the LLP was made on

29 February 2016. In this case, the noter seeks an order under section 214A of the Insolvency

Act 1986 (“the 1986 Act”) for recovery of sums withdrawn by the respondent from the LLP in the

two year period before the granting of the winding up order. Prior to winding-up, the LLP had

been in administration, the administrator having been appointed on 22 December 2014.

[2] The withdrawals by the respondent which are the subject of the present claim were made

monthly from March 2014 to December 2014. The total sum withdrawn was £78,259.84. The

basis for the noter’s claim, in terms of section 214A of the 1986 Act, is that the respondent knew

or had reasonable grounds for believing that at the time of each of the withdrawals the LLP was

unable to pay its debts within the meaning of section 123 of the 1986 Act, and that he knew or

ought to have concluded at the time of each withdrawal that there was no reasonable prospect

that the LLP would avoid going into insolvent liquidation. The respondent denies these

allegations. The case called before me for a proof before answer on the parties’ averments in the

[3] The noter gave evidence, in which he explained how his appointment had come about,

the investigations he had conducted and the information which he had obtained. He explained

that the respondent was appointed as a member of the LLP on 17 November 2003. The other

members of the LLP were Anjum Mobarik, Shokat Mobarik and Riaz Mobarik. Anjum and

Shokat Mobarik are brothers and Riaz Mobarik is their father. Riaz Mobarik resigned as a

member of the LLP with effect from 1 January 2005. Each member of the LLP has been, at some

point, a director of LTC Distributors Limited (“LTC”), which had significant business links with

the LLP. The noter explained his understanding of the financial position of the LLP at the

material times and what, in his view, the respondent knew or ought to have concluded.

[4] On behalf of the respondent, evidence was led firstly from Mr Akmal Khushi. Mr Khushi

is a director of and shareholder in a company which owns a major international retail business in

the field of outdoor goods and sportswear. He is a respected member of the business community

and has known the Mobarik family for many years. His evidence primarily concerned a meeting

in July 2014 at which Heads of Agreement were reached in an effort to resolve differences

[5] Next, the respondent, who is a 53 year old chartered accountant, gave evidence about the

LLP and its relations with LTC and the facts and circumstances known to him at the time of the

withdrawals. His evidence included that, until December 2014, the LLP had been supported by

other business interests of Anjum and Shokat Mobarik, most significantly by LTC. LTC supplied

stock with the Premier Housewares brand to the LLP. Since 2003, LTC provided, year on year,

long term financial support to the LLP. Until December 2014 there was no reason to believe that

the trading position of the LLP would be any different going forward, so far as the financial

support from LTC, as majority creditor, was concerned. The LLP would pay the invoices issued

by LTC in full within 12 months from the date of issue. From knowledge obtained from

attending LTC meetings and discussions with the Mobarik family there was no anticipation or

expectation that any of the family members would contemplate insolvency proceedings in

relation to the LLP. A 10% credit note (a rebate of 10% of the value of the total annual sales) had

been issued by LTC each year up to and including 2013. It was only in December 2014, after the

decision was taken to put the LLP into administration, that LTC decided that the annual credit

note for the calendar year 2014 was not to be issued. Up to that point the support of LTC had

been constant. The LLP had a relatively small number of creditors and debts were met by the

LLP without delay, including PAYE. It was only after a family disagreement between the

brothers that Shokat Mobarik decided he could no longer continue to support the running of the

LLP. The brothers had been in negotiations to allow Shokat Mobarik to continue the LLP under

his sole control. The expectation was that Anjum Mobarik would resign from the LLP. Only in

December 2014 did things reach a stage where the working relationship was untenable. There

was no reason to believe or suspect, far less conclude, that any or all of the withdrawals of

money prior to and including the withdrawal in December 2014 were made in circumstances in

which there was no reasonable prospect of the LLP avoiding insolvent liquidation. There were

no signs of cash-flow problems for the LLP. There were no decrees for payment sought or made

against the LLP. External creditors were minimal and were being paid on time. There were no

external borrowings. Additional funding facilities were available to the LLP.

[6] Finally, Shokat Mobarik gave evidence about the creation and development of the

businesses, including that of the LLP and LTC, the business models, and how issues arose that

led to a proposal to split the business interests of family members. He is 56 years old and now

resides in Pakistan. LTC had always been the sole supplier of goods to the LLP, as it had been

for the general partnership. LTC imported the goods from China, Spain and other countries.

The goods were sold to the LLP at the same time as the LLP sold them on to its customers. LTC

would invoice the LLP at the end of each month for all of the goods that the LLP had sold that

month. The LLP would receive a significant discount from the price at which it bought the goods

from LTC, enabling the LLP to cover its costs and make a profit. LTC gave the LLP a credit term

of one year. The discount, or profit margin, was 28%-32%. In addition, there was a 10% rebate or

credit note, given at the end of the year. In essence, the LLP was a marketing arm of LTC,

although it also stored the goods. None of the directors of LTC suggested that its support for the

LLP would be withdrawn. Several meetings were held to discuss the separation of business

interests. The general arrangement was going to be that Anjum Mobarik would retain the cash

and carry division of LTC and would resign from the LLP. Shokat Mobarik would have sole

ownership of the import division of LTC and of the LLP. Shokat Mobarik intended to put more

capital into the LLP and to reduce the rent and storage charges. He would have complete control

of the amount of discount and rebate to be given by LTC to the LLP. He thought that the LLP

would become a very viable and profitable business as a result of his restructuring efforts. By the

beginning of December 2014 it was becoming apparent that Anjum was not implementing the

arrangement. Shokat Mobarik had always advised the respondent that he intended to inject

more capital into the LLP following the separation of business interests, that he would also

reduce the rent and storage charges and increase the discount given by LTC, and that the

intention was to continue with the LLP. Had the separation of business interests occurred, that is

what would have happened. The turnover of the LLP was increasing. Had these steps been

taken it would have become extremely profitable. The relations between the LLP and its

creditors were always excellent. There were no difficulties with payments. There were no cash

flow issues and no bank or other borrowings. At no point had any creditor taken legal

proceedings. It was always in LTC’s interests that the LLP kept going. The stock was branded as

the LLP’s stock. LTC would suffer huge losses on the demise of the LLP.

[7] It is not necessary for me to rehearse at this stage the contents of the evidence in any

further detail, firstly because the material parts of it upon which parties rely is noted in my

summary of their respective submissions and, secondly, because, where appropriate, I have

referred to relevant parts of the evidence in explaining my decision and the reasons for it.

[8] Section 214A of the Insolvency Act 1986 (as inserted by Regulation 4 and Schedule 3 of

the Limited Liability Partnerships (Scotland) Regulations 2001) is headed “Adjustment of

“(1) This section has effect in relation to a person who is or has been a member of a

limited liability partnership where, in the course of the winding up of that limited

liability partnership, it appears that subsection (2) of this section applies in relation to that

(a) within the period of two years ending with the commencement of the winding up, he

was a member of the limited liability partnership who withdrew property of the limited

liability partnership, whether in the form of a share of profits, salary, repayment of or

payment of interest on a loan to the limited liability partnership or any other withdrawal

(b) it is proved by the liquidator to the satisfaction of the court that at the time of the

withdrawal he knew or had reasonable grounds for believing that the limited liability

(i) was at the time of the withdrawal unable to pay its debts within the meaning of

(ii) would become so unable to pay its debts after the assets of the limited liability

partnership had been depleted by that withdrawal taken together with all other

withdrawals (if any) made by any members contemporaneously with that

(3) Where this section has effect in relation to any person the court, on the application of

the liquidator, may declare that that person is to be liable to make such contribution (if

any) to the limited liability partnership's assets as the court thinks proper.

(4) The court shall not make a declaration in relation to any person the amount of which

exceeds the aggregate of the amounts or values of all the withdrawals referred to in

subsection (2) made by that person within the period of 2 years referred to in that

(5) The court shall not make a declaration under this section with respect to any person

unless that person knew or ought to have concluded that after each withdrawal referred

to in subsection (2) there was no reasonable prospect that the limited liability partnership

(6) For the purposes of subsection (5) the facts which a member ought to know or

ascertain, the conclusions which he ought to reach and the steps which he ought to have

taken are those which would be known or ascertained, or reached or taken, by a

(a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected

of a person carrying out the same functions as are carried out by that member in

(b) the general knowledge, skill and experience that that member has.

(7) For the purposes of this section a limited liability partnership goes into insolvent

liquidation if it goes into liquidation at a time when its assets are insufficient for the

payment of its debts and other liabilities and the expenses of the winding up.

[9] Section 123 of the 1986 Act deals with the definition of inability to pay debts. Only parts

of subsection (1), and subsection (2), are relevant for present purposes and the relevant

(e) if it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the company is unable to pay its debts

(2) A company is also deemed unable to pay its debts if it is proved to the satisfaction of

the court that the value of the company's assets is less than the amount of its liabilities,

taking into account its contingent and prospective liabilities.”

[10] The noter moved the court to grant paragraphs (iii) and (iv) of the prayer of the Note,

which in essence are to declare that the respondent is liable to make a contribution of £78,259.84

to the assets of Premier Housewares (Scotland) LLP, together with interest thereon and to find

that the expenses of and incidental to the Note shall be legitimate expenses in the liquidation of

the LLP. The submissions of the noter in support of that motion can briefly be summarised as

[11] There were three limbs to the statutory test which the noter required to meet. The first

limb (as set forth in section 214A(1) and 214A(2)(a) of the 1986 Act) is that the respondent

requires to have been a member of the LLP within the period of two years ending on the

commencement of the winding up, who withdrew property (which includes money) from the

LLP during that period. That matter was not disputed by the respondent.

[12] The second limb (in terms of section 214A(2)(b)(i)) is that it has to be proved to the

satisfaction of the court that at the time of each withdrawal the respondent knew or had

reasonable grounds for believing that the LLP was unable to pay its debts within the meaning of

section 123 of the 1986 Act. In terms of section 123, one of the means by which a company is

deemed unable to pay its debts is if it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the value of

the company’s assets is less than the amount of its liabilities, taking into account its contingent

and prospective liabilities (section 123(2)). That is commonly known as balance-sheet insolvency,

in contradistinction to the cash-flow insolvency test provided by section 123 (1)(e).

[13] The third limb (as stated in section 214A(5)) is that the court shall not make a declaration

that the respondent is liable to make such contribution unless the respondent knew or ought to

have concluded that after each withdrawal of property there was no reasonable prospect that the

LLP would avoid going into insolvent liquidation. The details of how this limb of the test falls to

[14] In relation to limb 2, reference was made to Bucci v Carman (Liquidator of Casa Estates (UK)

Ltd) [2014] BCC 269, in which the Court of Appeal applied the decision of the Supreme Court in

BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL Plc [2013] UKSC 28; [2013] 1 WLR

1408; [2013] BCC 397. These cases show that the court requires to make a judgment as to

whether it has been established that, looking at the company’s assets and making proper

allowance for its prospective or contingent liabilities, it cannot reasonably be expected to meet

those liabilities. If so, it will be deemed to be insolvent even if it is currently able to meet its

debts as they fall due. It is counter-intuitive that a company that manages to stave off cash-flow

insolvency by going deeper and deeper into long term debt is not insolvent.

[15] In relation to limb 3, analogous cases could be found in respect of alleged wrongful

trading by company directors. The answer to the question of whether the respondent knew or

ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that the LLP would avoid an

insolvent liquidation depends on rational expectations of what the future might hold: Re Hawkes

Hill Publishing Co Ltd (In Liquidation) [2007] BCC 937. Liability has been held to attach where the

person has been held to have no rational basis for believing that the event they hoped would

save the company would come about: Re Ralls Builders Ltd (In Liquidation) [2016] BCC 293.

Wilfully blind optimism is not sufficient, nor is a reckless belief that something might turn up

when on any objective view that was groundless and forlorn: Roberts (Liquidator of Onslow

Ditchling Ltd) [2012] BCC 407, a case in which the company was trading using credit extended to

it by its suppliers. A speculative hope that it might all work out is not sufficient: Re Kudos

Business Solutions Ltd (In Liquidation) [2012] 2 BCLC 65. The courts have been prepared to place

some weight upon whether professional advice was taken: Re Hawkes Hill Publishing Co Ltd; Re

[16] The evidence of the noter and Mr Khushi should be accepted, but the respondent was not

credible or reliable. As for Mr Mobarik, parts of his evidence should be treated with caution.

[17] It was a matter of agreement that the first limb of the test was met. In relation to limb 2, it

had been proved that, at the time of each withdrawal, the respondent knew or had reasonable

grounds for believing that the LLP was unable to pay its debts within the meaning of section 123

of the 1986 Act. The LLP was balance-sheet insolvent, to the respondent’s knowledge, in the

period March to December 2014. It had never made a profit in any year. Its balance-sheet

insolvency was increasing year-on-year. There was no evidence of any properly funded plan to

reverse that situation. The extended period of credit from LTC was not something which the

LLP had as of right. In fact, LTC was entitled to demand payment earlier than the end of the one

year period. On that basis, the LLP fell foul of the cash-flow insolvency test as well.

[18] Turning to limb 3, the evidence of the noter established that this part of the test was also

met. No profit had ever been made and in the last published accounts of the LLP, for the period

to 31 March 2013, its liabilities had exceeded its assets by almost £4.7 million. Emphasis had

been placed by the LLP’s auditors on the existence of a material uncertainty which may cast

significant doubt about the LLP’s ability to continue as a going concern. Further significant

losses were incurred between 31 March 2013 and the entry into administration of the LLP, as

shown in the administrator’s estimated statement of affairs as at 29 December 2014. There was

no evidence of an implementable plan, within a timescale, which would have cleared the LLP’s

[19] On the evidence, LTC and the LLP were not controlled in the same manner. The majority

of shareholders and directors in LTC were in the camp of Anjum Mobarik. No weight should be

given to Shokat Mobarik’s assertion that LTC’s interests involved the LLP being supported come

what may. He was not in a position to obtain the outcome that he wished from LTC. LTC took

no steps to stop administration or liquidation. The proposed split of business interests, referred

to in the evidence led for the respondent, was conditional on Anjum Mobarik coming back to

give consent, but in fact the discord remained in place and consent was never given. Any plan

for the future was aspirational, undeveloped and undocumented. A reasonably diligent person

in the position of the respondent would have sought details of any plan and justifications for the

[20] The evidence of Shokat Mobarik, and indeed of the respondent, supported that view.

LTC was not prepared to provide a larger discount to the LLP than the previously agreed figure

when requested to do so. The respondent had resigned his directorship of LTC in 2012 because

of concerns he had about a conflict of interest between that and his position as a member of the

LLP. This clearly indicated knowledge on the part of the respondent that LTC and the LLP had

divergent positions. The noter was right to describe the accumulated liabilities of the LLP as

“unassailable”. The idea that a negotiated split of business interests between Anjum and

Shokat Mobarik might avoid insolvent liquidation was merely a speculative hope. The

negotiations lacked detail, were based on significant conditions and never reached any

substantive agreement. The respondent would have been aware of the proposal to split the

businesses during the first two months of 2014. But there was no evidence of any particular

increase in discount, or other financial support, which would resolve the LLP’s financial state.

There was no rational or proper basis on which to conclude that there existed a reasonable

prospect that the LLP might avoid going into insolvent liquidation. Ultimately, the respondent’s

evidence boiled down to little more than blind hope that the family would be able to reconcile.

This flew in the face of the discord in the family, of which the respondent was aware. A

reasonably diligent person would have sought knowledge of all the underlying reasons for the

discord. The court should conclude that the respondent knew more about the length, basis for

and degree of discord between the brothers than he was willing to admit.

[21] For these reasons, paragraphs (iii) and (iv) of the prayer of the Note should be granted.

[22] In brief summary, the submissions for the respondent were as follows. The respondent’s

second and third pleas-in-law should be sustained and the prayer of the Note should be refused.

Section 123(2) of the 1986 Act is a deeming provision. It provides for a rebuttable presumption.

In terms of section 214A, there were two things to bear in mind. Firstly, each payment required

to be considered separately. Secondly, at each payment date the noter required to prove that

limbs 2 and 3 of the test were met. In respect of limb 3, the respondent did not require to prove

that he had a reasonable belief that insolvency would not happen. Rather, the noter required to

prove that the respondent knew or ought to have known that there was no reasonable prospect

[23] The drawings made by the respondent, which are the subject of the present proceedings,

were never a matter of concern during the administration or to HMRC, nor were they the reason

for the LLP being put into liquidation. Matters should not be viewed retrospectively but from

the viewpoint of the respondent at the material time. The noter had little understanding of how

LTC and the LLP actually operated. The evidence of Mr Khushi should be accepted in its

entirety. The respondent had given up his professional career as a chartered accountant to join

the business. He worked closely with the Mobarik family. He knew they would not like to lose

face by the LLP going into insolvency. While not aware of the intimate details of the dispute

between the brothers, he knew the general position. He was intimately involved in the running

of the LLP. He was fully aware of how the family and the businesses interacted and gave

reasons why he expected them to continue to do so. He was entirely credible and reliable. There

was an inextricable link between the businesses. It was not in the interests of LTC for the LLP to

struggle. There were no significant assets of the LLP to be distributed in any liquidation. LTC

was the sole supplier of goods to the LLP and the LLP was the sole customer of LTC. There was

a direct link between the import side of LTC and the business of the LLP. It was not in anyone’s

interest for the LLP to fail. They were owned and controlled by the same family.

[24] The LLP did not go into administration at the instance of any creditor. Rather, it was put

into administration because protracted negotiations between the brothers were getting nowhere.

Shokat Mobarik had become exasperated. The LLP was voluntarily put into administration.

Shokat Mobarik had no personal interest in the matter before the court. He provided detailed

evidence of the relationship with his brother and how it had become soured. He was intimately

aware of all that was going on. On his evidence, it was clear that the respondent had a sound

basis for understanding the LLP had a future which did not involve insolvent liquidation.

Immediately prior to the LLP going into administration all of the creditors were being paid on

time. There was no bank debt. LTC, as the largest creditor, proceeded on the basis that its debts

[25] A deeming provision, such as section 123(2), creates a rebuttable presumption. Reference

was made to: Lafarge (Aggregates) Ltd v London Borough of Newham [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 577; Re

Thundercrest Ltd [1994] BCC 857; and to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in BNY Corporate

Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL Plc [2011] Bus LR 1359.

[26] The 12 month period of credit provided by LTC had always been the basis upon which its

debts were to be paid. The absence of a written agreement on this matter was not relevant and

was not required. There was an established method of trading which would have prevented

LTC from recovering within the 12 months. The commercial reality was of the two aligned

businesses being run by the one family and relying upon each other. The general partnership

did not rely solely on the LLP and had income streams from elsewhere. The evidence of LTC’s

desire to keep the LLP running was strengthened by Mr Mobarik’s evidence that a large amount

of stock was branded with the LLP’s brand. Customers were loyal to the LLP and it was not

plausible to consider that they could simply be transferred to a new entity.

[27] At the time of the withdrawals, the respondent was aware of the general intention that

business assets were to be divided. He understood that Shokat Mobarik would have complete

control over the import side of LTC and of rental and storage charges, as well as complete control

of the LLP. The result would have been that these charges and the discount and rebate given to

the LLP would be controlled by Shokat Mobarik. He would have had nothing to fear by injecting

capital, which he had available. With these negotiations going on, the respondent reasonably

understood at all material times that things were heading in the right direction and that insolvent

liquidation was not likely to happen. The LLP was about to enter into a new phase.

[28] As was made clear in BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL Plc

(para 44), section 123(2) is an adjunct to section 123(1), which deals with the reality of being

unable to pay debts as they fall due. A company which is technically balance-sheet insolvent is

not deemed to be unable to pay its debts if the reality is that it is in fact paying its debts as they

fall due. The noter had provided no evidence of any debts not being met as they fell due. He

accepted that the LLP was placed into administration by its members and not by any creditor.

Accordingly the deeming provision was, on the evidence, overridden and section 214A could not

apply. It was crucial to take into account the business model. Goods were sold on consignment,

when the LLP had already agreed to sell these on. A snapshot view was misleading.

[29] In relation to limb 3, while there was discord between the brothers, there were concerted

efforts to find a solution and to separate the business interests. As explained by Mr Khushi, they

met and produced the Heads of Agreement. Shokat Mobarik did everything he could to try to

bring about the separation, or demerger, of business interests. Had this been successful he

would have controlled all three of the relevant businesses. The LLP could have returned to

profit. This was exactly what Shokat Mobarik was trying to do. He explained that he would

have put more capital into the LLP and reduced the rent and storage charges. He would have

control of all the economic levers. There was a basis for the respondent to think there was a

reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation. Formal documentation would not be

expected in a family business of this kind. It was only in December 2014 that Shokat Mobarik

decided to vote to put the LLP into administration. Until then there was a genuine and

reasonably held anticipation that the demerger would be successful. There was reason to believe

that the LLP would be turned round and made profitable. Shokat Mobarik had a plan and had

turned the business round before. The respondent had no way of knowing that the demerger

[30] For these reasons the prayer of the Note should be refused.

[31] The submissions for the respondent had not properly engaged with the considerations in

the case law. It was incorrect to say that the LLP did not have assets; the accounts showed

reasonably substantial assets. There was no evidence about any amount of capital which was

intended to be injected. On the administrator’s estimate, more than £10m would be required.

The administration in fact came about because of inability to pay debts. There was no basis for

implying an agreement as to a 12 month period of credit being granted by LTC – the evidence

was that the LLP had no right to that period. A new firm had been set up following the

[32] Each witness gave his evidence in an open and clear manner. All of them struck me as

telling the truth and not seeking to mislead the court or to conceal any matters of relevance. The

noter was quite clear as to the basis upon which he felt that the case against the respondent could

be made and he explained that in his evidence. Mr Khushi was plainly a very highly-regarded

businessman and he had done his best to assist in seeking to resolve the issues arising between

members of the family, of whom he was a trusted and respected friend. The respondent, a

qualified and experienced chartered accountant, came across as a thoughtful and honest

individual. While mildly defensive on one or two points, that was perhaps not unusual in the

context of being accused of removing funds when he knew or ought to have known of

impending insolvency. Shokat Mobarik came across as a very hard working and experienced

businessman, who had dealt in a mature and admirable fashion with difficulties which had

arisen in his wider family life. For these reasons, I have accepted as accurate the facts as spoken

to by all of the witnesses. In the case of the noter, he explained what was known to him, but he

was not of course privy to the full facts and circumstances which obtained at the times when the

withdrawals were made. The evidence from the noter and from each of those involved at the

material time was credible and reliable. I therefore reject the contentions for the noter as to any

lack of credibility or reliability on the part of the witnesses for the respondent.

[33] The first part of the test (“limb 1”) is dealt with in sections 214A(1) and 214A(2)(a) of the

1986 Act, and requires that the respondent had made the withdrawals which are the subject of

the present claim within two years of winding up, when he was a member of the LLP. The

second part of the test (“limb 2”) is that it must to be proved by the liquidator to the satisfaction

of the court that at the time of each of the withdrawals the respondent knew or had reasonable

grounds for believing that the limited liability partnership was unable to pay its debts within the

meaning of section 123 of the Act (section 214A(2)(b)). The third part of the test (“limb 3”) is that

the court shall not make a declaration under the section with respect to any person unless that

person knew or ought to have concluded that after each withdrawal there was no reasonable

prospect that the limited liability partnership would avoid going into insolvent liquidation

(section 214A(5)). For the purposes of limb 3, the facts which a member ought to know or

ascertain, the conclusions which he ought to reach and the steps which he ought to have taken

are those which would be known or ascertained, or reached or taken, by a reasonably diligent

person having both: (a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be

expected of a person carrying out the same functions as are carried out by that member in

relation to the limited liability partnership, and (b) the general knowledge, skill and experience

[35] In relation to limb 2 of the test, on behalf of the respondent it was contended that

section 123 of the 1986 Act is a deeming provision, which, if satisfied, creates a rebuttable

presumption. The evidence that the company was in fact paying its debts as they fell due was

said to rebut the presumption. In my view, that is an incorrect characterisation of the meaning

[36] In BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL Plc, the Supreme Court

considered the meaning and effect of section 123. Lord Walker (with whose reasoning the other

Justices agreed) observed that the “cash-flow” test (in section 123(1)(e)) is concerned:

“not simply with the petitioner's own presently-due debt, nor only with other presently-

due debt owed by the company, but also with debts falling due from time to time in the

reasonably near future. What is the reasonably near future, for this purpose, will depend

on all the circumstances, but especially on the nature of the company's business” (para

Further, in section 123(2), the express reference to assets and liabilities was:

“a practical recognition that once the court has to move beyond the reasonably near

future (the length of which depends, again, on all the circumstances) any attempt to apply

a cash-flow test will become completely speculative, and a comparison of present assets

with present and future liabilities (discounted for contingencies and deferment) becomes

the only sensible test. But it is still very far from an exact test, and the burden of proof

must be on the party which asserts balance-sheet insolvency”(para 37).

Lord Walker added (para 38) that whether or not the test of balance-sheet insolvency is satisfied

must depend on the available evidence as to the circumstances of the particular case. He went on

to refer to the observations made by Lord Neuberger in the court below (reported at

[2011] 1 WLR 2524) concerning section 123(2), including the following:

“[44] In practical terms, it would be rather extraordinary if section 123(2) was satisfied

every time a company's liabilities exceeded the value of its assets. Many companies which

are solvent and successful, and many companies early on in their lives, would be deemed

unable to pay their debts if this was the meaning of section 123(2)…

[47] More generally, I find it hard to discern any conceivable policy reason why a

company should be at risk of being wound up simply because the aggregate value

(however calculated) of its liabilities exceeds that of its assets. Many companies in that

position are successful and creditworthy, and cannot in any way be characterised as

“unable to pay [their] debts”. Such a mechanistic, even artificial, reason for permitting a

creditor to present a petition to wind up a company could, in my view, only be justified if

the words of section 123(2) compelled that conclusion, and in my opinion they do not.”

Lord Neuberger went on to use of the expression “the point of no return” as part of his analysis

of the meaning and effect of the provision. Lord Walker did not endorse the use of that

expression, but referred (para 42) with approval to the judgment of Toulson LJ in the Court of

“…Essentially, section 123(2) requires the court to make a judgment whether it has been

established that, looking at the company's assets and making proper allowance for its

prospective and contingent liabilities, it cannot reasonably be expected to be able to meet

those liabilities. If so, it will be deemed insolvent although it is currently able to pay its

debts as they fall due. The more distant the liabilities, the harder this will be to establish.”

[37] As these observations make clear, for the purposes of the definition of inability to pay

debts, the fact that liabilities exceed assets at a particular point in time is not of itself conclusive.

On the other hand, it does not follow from the fact that the company is currently paying its debts

as they fall due that the test of inability to pay debts cannot be met. Rather, the court has to look

at the wider picture. In particular, this wider picture includes (for the purposes of section 123(1))

taking into account debts falling due in the reasonably near future and (for the purposes of

section 123(2)), looking at the company’s assets and making proper allowance for its prospective

and contingent liabilities, to see whether it cannot reasonably be expected to meet those

liabilities. Satisfaction of either sub-section, read and understood in these terms, results in a

deemed inability to pay debts. It is therefore not correct to say, as the respondent contended, that

the fact that a company is currently paying its debts as they fall due amounts to a rebuttal of

what, in a case of balance-sheet insolvency, as described by Lord Walker, would be the deemed

position in terms of section 123(2) of inability to pay debts. In short, evidence that a company is

currently paying its debts as they fall due does not of itself prevent the company being deemed

to be unable to pay its debts; that can still be the conclusion when one looks at the wider picture.

[38] As was also made clear in BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL Plc, it

is of course necessary to address the particular facts and circumstances pertaining to the entity in

question. I now turn to do so. While the discussion that follows at this point is in the context of

limb 2 of the test, many of the facts and circumstances are also relevant for the purposes of

[39] In the present case, the LLP was not a stand-alone trading entity. Rather, it was one of

three family businesses, all having some involvement and connection with each other. In the case

of LTC, that involvement and connection with the LLP was extensive and fundamental to each of

their businesses, as the LLP was the sole means of selling the goods which LTC imported. The

LLP had the customer base, which was understood to be unwilling to deal directly with LTC

because of the cash and carry nature of part of that entity’s activities. The general partnership,

whose members included the Mobarik brothers, had a continuing interest in renting out premises

to the LLP for storage. There was simply no evidence that the family members were willing to

allow the LLP to go into insolvent liquidation, prior to December 2014. The effect of it doing so

would be to leave LTC with millions of pounds of irrecoverable debt (leaving aside any dividend

from the realisation of the, relatively speaking, limited assets of the LLP). As the accounts stated,

the members of the LLP were, at all material times, confident of continued support, particularly

[40] The LLP’s business model was somewhat unusual. It arranged for the sale of goods

which were then consigned to it by LTC. It stored the goods and paid the storage charges.

Notwithstanding that the LLP received the 32% discount and the 10% rebate, it had never made a

profit. In its final accounts, its trading loss was some £280,965. According to those accounts, its

liabilities exceeded its assets by £4,670,060. The debt claimed by LTC following the entry of the

LLP into administration was £11.79m. Yet the LLP had never been subjected to pressure from

creditors, because, according to the evidence, it always paid its debts on time. It was, on

Shokat Mobarik’s evidence, in effect the marketing arm of LTC. The evidence on how it might

have become profitable if the separation of business interests or demerger did not occur was

relatively limited. On the negative side, attempts to increase the discount had been resisted by

LTC’s other directors. On the positive side, Shokat Mobarik’s evidence was that turnover was

increasing. In view of the existence of the 32% discount and the 10% annual rebate, any increase

in turnover would result in the return of significant percentage of that increase to the LLP. I was

not, however, shown evidence of what level of increase in turnover would be required to render

[41] LTC was, on the face of it, dependent on the LLP to generate sales and to purchase from

LTC the goods to be sold. The evidence was that LTC charged the LLP the same price for the

goods as that at which the LLP had agreed to sell the goods to its customers, and then the

discount was applied. The financial position of LTC was not itself the subject of evidence.

[42] The noter led no evidence, and made no submissions, as to any differences in the specific

facts and circumstances at the time of each withdrawal. Rather, the approach taken was that

standing the financial position of the LLP during the period within which the withdrawals

occurred, the respondent was liable. I do not therefore require to consider each individual

[43] On behalf of the noter, it was submitted that the period of credit allowed by LTC was not

binding upon it, with the result that LTC could simply enforce payment of the outstanding debt

at any time. Even if that is formally correct, I do not perceive it to be a material, let alone

decisive, factor. In light of the evidence of the established pattern of a 12 month period of credit

and of the members of the LLP understanding that the support of LTC would continue, and no

suggestion of LTC ever seeking payment at an earlier point in time than 12 months, I do not

regard the possibility of earlier enforcement to be something which the respondent should have

had in mind. The 12 month period of credit was, on the evidence, to his knowledge implicitly

[44] Mr Khushi explained that, at the meeting in July 2014, the Mobarik family indicated an

intention to provide continuing financial support to all parts of the Mobarik businesses. There

was no suggestion of anyone even considering the prospect of any of the businesses, including

the LLP, being placed into administration or liquidation. The Heads of Agreement reached at the

meeting recorded that the family would work together to further the earlier agreement in

principle that the business interests of the brothers would be separated.

[45] The respondent’s evidence included that, on the information available to him the position

was as follows: (a) the LLP was repaying the debts to LTC and to external creditors on a formal

and regular basis; (b) in a liquidation LTC would have been left with substantial trading losses

as it was dependent on the LLP as its only customer, the LLP having an established housewares

market in the UK and abroad; and (c) the Mobarik family did not wish to incur the reputational

damage occasioned by any insolvency, which would have damaged their family name in the

community. The respondent’s testimony was that from the outset LTC had provided, year on

year, long term financial support to the LLP. There was never any reason, until December 2014,

to believe that, going forward, there would be any change in the financial support from LTC, as

majority creditor. The 10% rebate had been given by LTC every year and it was only in

December 2014, after the decision was taken to put the LLP into administration, that LTC

decided that the credit note for the calendar year 2014 was not to be issued. There was no

indication in advance that this might occur. The respondent knew that the brothers had been in

negotiations to allow Shokat Mobarik to continue the LLP under his sole control. The

respondent also stated that the expectation was that Anjum Mobarik would resign from the LLP.

Only in December 2014 did it become clear that the LLP would not be able to continue to rely on

LTC’s financial support. He described this as a “sudden change in circumstances” which could

not have been predicted. He had been aware of differences between the brothers for some time,

but only in May 2014 did he become aware of the demerger being suggested. But there was

never any suggestion of insolvency or that this was something which the family members ever

[46] Shokat Mobarik was able to speak authoritatively about the position of the LLP and LTC,

having been, respectively, a member and a director. His evidence was that at no time was it ever

intended that the relationship between the two businesses would change. In particular, none of

the directors of LTC had suggested that its support for the LLP would be withdrawn. After the

demerger, once Shokat Mobarik had sole ownership of the LLP and the import division of LTC, it

was his intention to put more capital into the LLP and reduce the rent and storage charges.

Having complete control of the amount of discount and rebate, his position was that the LLP

would become a very viable and profitable business. It was not in LTC’s interests that the LLP

would cease trading and go into insolvent liquidation, as that would result in “huge losses” to

LTC. It was only in December 2014 that he had decided that he was unable to continue in

business with his brother Anjum and at no stage before then had he advised the respondent of

any intention to wind-up the LLP. As he explained, he had always advised the respondent that

he intended to inject more capital into the LLP following the separation of business interests, that

he would also reduce the rent and storage charges and increase the discount given by LTC, and

that the intention was to continue with the LLP. Further, his unchallenged evidence was that the

[47] I turn now to apply the limb 2 part of the test. Dealing firstly with section 123(1)(e) and

applying the analysis from BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL Plc, as at the

date of each withdrawal of sums by the respondent, the debts falling due in the reasonably near

future were primarily but not exclusively the sums outstanding to LTC. These were very

substantial, but were being met. In addition, there were no obvious prospective liabilities, other

than those arising in the ordinary course of business, including later debts incurred to LTC, and

there was no evidence of contingent liabilities. I am satisfied that, having regard to all of the

information available to the respondent, he did not know, nor ought he to have concluded, that

the LLP was unable to pay its debts as they fell due for the purposes of section 123(1)(e). That

provision, however, is not of course the only relevant part of section 123 on the question of

[48] Turning to section 123(2), and applying the test stated by Toulson LJ and endorsed by the

Supreme Court, I require to decide, having regard to the company’s assets and liabilities, and

making proper allowance for its prospective and contingent liabilities, whether the respondent

knew or ought to have concluded that the LLP was unable to pay its debts, in respect that it

[49] I accept that the extent of the LLP’s balance-sheet insolvency was increasing year-on-year

and indeed that further significant losses were incurred between 31 March 2013 and the entry

into administration of the LLP. There was, as the noter submitted, no evidence of any properly

funded and implementable plan to reverse that situation, although there was of course evidence

as to the proposed demerger and its consequences. There was little evidence as to how the LLP

could pay back the debt due to LTC, other than by incurring further liabilities to LTC. It might

be argued that the LLP could reasonably be expected to meet these existing liabilities because of

the period of credit, with the result that the debt then existing to LTC and others would have

been paid off, from the proceeds of later sales of goods consigned by LTC. However, an

expectation that the LLP would meet its existing liabilities, by making payment of them in return

for incurring further liabilities in their place, does not in my view suffice to avoid the test in

section 123(2) being met: in order to pay the existing debt to LTC, new debt to LTC to the same

extent required to be incurred. On that basis, the ongoing liabilities to LTC would continue

without, in reality, being extinguished or met. Another way to put it, bearing in mind

Lord Walker’s analysis, is that the future LTC debt falls to be taken into account as a prospective

liability of the LLP. As such, it must, for the purposes of the test, form part of the liabilities

[50] The reality was that LTC could only begin to be reimbursed by the LLP for the extensive

historic debt if the LLP began to make a profit. The means by which, and the timescale within

which, that might occur were not established in evidence. In relation to the evidence about the

proposed demerger and its potentially beneficial consequences, that does not in my opinion

establish that there was a reasonable expectation that the LLP would meet its liabilities (taking

appropriate account of its prospective and contingent liabilities). That evidence supports the

view that the LLP may very well continue in business, with the support of LTC, but it simply

does not follow that the LLP would make sufficient profit to be able to eradicate its accumulated

[51] Thus, I accept the submission of the noter that the respondent had reasonable grounds for

believing that the LLP was at the time of each of the withdrawals unable to pay its debts within

the meaning of section 123(2) of the Act. I stop short of concluding that he actually knew that the

LLP was unable to pay its debts, because that matter is really one which involves the exercise of

balance and judgment, and the evidence did not establish any such actual knowledge. But the

existence of reasonable grounds for belief is sufficient. I therefore conclude that the limb 2 part

[53] As I have indicated, the limb 2 element of the test, if there is no proof of actual knowledge

of inability to pay debts, depends upon there being reasonable grounds for believing that the

LLP was unable to pay its debts within the meaning of section 123. That requires proof that such

reasonable grounds existed, to the knowledge of the respondent. It also requires proof of the

elements noted in the case law, for example, if section 123(2) is relied upon, that the LLP could

[54] The limb 3 part of the test introduces a further requirement, that it be shown that the

respondent knew or ought to have concluded that after each withdrawal that there was no

reasonable prospect that the LLP would avoid going into insolvent liquidation. The criteria in

section 214A(6) fall to be applied for that purpose. The fact that the LLP was, at a particular

point in time, insolvent in the sense of being unable to pay its debts, does not mean that it follows

that there was no reasonable prospect of it avoiding insolvent liquidation; satisfaction of limb 2

does not mean that limb 3 is also satisfied (Re Hawkes Hill Publishing Co Ltd (In Liquidation)).

[55] As a matter of onus, it might be said that the noter requires to prove the absence of a basis

for concluding that there was a reasonable prospect of the LLP avoiding insolvent liquidation; it

is not for the respondent to prove the presence of such a reasonable prospect. But this is no more

than an onus point, which flies off when the evidence has been led. Once the evidence is led, the

court can conclude on whether, at the time of each withdrawal, there was or was not a reasonable

prospect of the LLP avoiding insolvent liquidation. If there was no reasonable prospect, and the

respondent either knew that or ought to have so concluded (having regard to the factors to be

taken into account under section 214A(6)) then the limb 3 part of the test is met. It is equally

plain that, if at the time of the withdrawals there existed a reasonable prospect of the LLP

avoiding insolvent liquidation, of which the respondent was aware, the limb 3 part of the test

cannot be met; in those circumstances the respondent could not have known, nor ought he to

[56] In his contentions as to the limb 3 part of the test, again the noter made no distinction

between the various points in time at which the withdrawals occurred but relied upon the

evidence as to the LLP’s continuing financial difficulties. As I have observed earlier, there was

no evidence that any creditor was dissatisfied with the timing of debt repayments, let alone that

any creditor ever threatened to raise, or actually raised, any proceedings. It is true that as at

December 2014, on the administrator’s findings, some £1m of other debts (that is other than debts

to LTC) existed, but there was no evidence of any earlier failures to pay. Nor was there any

evidence that, at the time the withdrawals were made, there was any suggestion of the initiation

of procedures for insolvent liquidation (whether at that point or in the future) voluntarily or by a

creditor. True it is that the plug was eventually pulled by the members of the LLP, but that does

not assist in assessing the prospect of such an event as at the time of the withdrawals.

[57] Insolvent liquidation requires a process. That process is normally initiated either

voluntarily or by creditors. If there is no evidence that initiation of the process voluntarily might

occur and no evidence that any creditor was likely to initiate the process, that is plainly material

which requires to be taken into account; insolvent liquidation will be avoided if the process will

[58] The evidence of the respondent about the consequences of insolvent liquidation and in

particular its effects on LTC and the family was convincing. So too was his evidence, supported

by that of Shokat Mobarik, of the long term financial support provided by LTC to the LLP. There

was no reason for, and no indication of, any potential change, until the “sudden change in

circumstances” which occurred in December 2014. I recognise that the LLP’s auditors had noted

the existence of a material uncertainty which, it was said, may cast significant doubt about the

LLP’s ability to continue as a going concern. But they also noted that the members of the LLP

remained confident of the continued support of, in particular, LTC. LTC was not controlled by

Shokat Mobarik, and its other directors were in the same camp as Anjum Mobarik, but that does

not lead to the view that LTC had any interest or desire in the LLP being placed into insolvent

liquidation. It is true that LTC took no steps to stop administration or liquidation when they

[59] Moreover, in relation to the demerger, while it is true that at the time of the withdrawals

Anjum Mobarik had not yet agreed to the terms of any split and required to take tax advice, the

general thrust of the evidence supported the existence of a reasonable prospect that the demerger

would occur. It was in fact the only solution on the table to the apparently irremediable discord

between the brothers. Had it occurred, Shokat Mobarik would have had full control over the

links between the import side of LTC and the LLP and it is an obvious conclusion from his

evidence that in those circumstances he would not have contemplated or initiated insolvent

liquidation of the LLP. The reasonable prospect that the demerger would occur and its likely

consequences therefore of themselves give rise, in turn, to a reasonable prospect of avoiding

[60] I have accepted the uncontested evidence from Shokat Mobarik that turnover was

increasing. It is however not possible to draw any specific conclusions from that evidence. With

greater turnover, the 32% discount and the 10% rebate would result in more money returning to

the LLP. But there was no evidence dealing with the point that if, say, a £10m turnover still did

not cover the LLP’s costs and allow a profit, how much would be needed to do so. Absent any

detailed evidence of projected future profit, I can only accept the broad point that increasing

turnover would have given increased returns for the LLP. Thus, the evidence about an increase

in turnover does not materially assist in establishing a reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent

[61] I do not accept that a reasonably diligent person in the position of the respondent

(applying the criteria in section 214A(6)) would, as was contended for the noter, have sought

from Shokat Mobarik details of any plan, along with justifications, for the LLP moving towards

profitability. The point was a broad one: he would control both entities, which relied upon each

other, and on his evidence he would have ensured their survival. Precise details of the financial

arrangements were not something a reasonably diligent person needed to know or should have

sought to ascertain. I also reject the contention that a reasonably diligent person would have

sought knowledge of all the underlying reasons for the discord between the brothers. The

reasons for the discord were of much less significance than the fact of its existence and the

probable effects of its continuance. The fact of its existence pointed towards a need to split the

business interests rather than towards the prospect of insolvent liquidation. Its probable effects

did not include any contemplation of insolvent liquidation; rather, they included a demerger

which, on Shokat Mobarik’s intentions, could only benefit the financial health of the LLP.

[62] No doubt in some cases, if it is shown (as I have concluded here) that there existed

reasonable grounds for believing that the relevant entity was unable to pay its debts because it

could not reasonably be expected to meet its liabilities, it may be difficult to find a basis for

concluding that it nonetheless had a reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation. But

the circumstances of the present case are somewhat unusual. I conclude that the noter has not

established that the respondent knew, or ought to have concluded, that there was no reasonable

prospect of the LLP avoiding insolvent liquidation. On the evidence, there was no suggestion of

any creditor being likely to initiate an insolvency process, nor was there evidence suggesting

voluntary initiation of the process. Further, there were good reasons (as explained in the

evidence of the respondent and of Shokat Mobarik) why LTC and the family members would not

want insolvency to occur and indeed would continue to support the LLP. The evidence on these

points, taken together, suffices to establish the existence of a reasonable prospect of avoiding

insolvent liquidation. The evidence concerning the discussions and proposals for a demerger of

the interests of the family members, in particular of the brothers, and the consequences of such a

move, also, and independently, supports the position that there was a reasonable prospect of

[63] Turning to the cases founded upon by the noter, I accept that the concept of a reasonable

prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation requires consideration of rational expectations of what

the future might hold: Re Hawkes Hill Publishing Co Ltd (In Liquidation). I have no difficulty in

concluding that the respondent’s expectations, viewed in terms of section 214A(6), were entirely

rational and satisfied that requirement. Unlike the circumstances of Re Ralls Builders Ltd (In

Liquidation), this is not a case where hope was placed on a specific event coming about which

would save the company. There were various other factors (such as the mutual business

interests and relationships and the absence of any suggestion of the initiation of insolvency)

which supported the existence of a reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation and

meant that the reasonably diligent person in the position of the respondent would not have

proceeded on the basis merely of the hope of some such event. But certainly from May 2014

there was separately, and in addition, a rational basis for concluding that the demerger plans

would come to fruition, with helpful consequences for the future of the LLP. For the same

reasons, having regard to the evidence, the present case cannot be described as one of wilfully

blind optimism or reckless belief that something might turn up, which on any objective view was

groundless and forlorn (Roberts (Liquidator of Onslow Ditchling Ltd). Nor did the position of the

respondent fall within merely a speculative hope that things might all work out (Re Kudos

Business Solutions Ltd (In Liquidation)); it had a reasonable and rational basis. I accept that in an

appropriate case some weight can be placed upon whether professional advice was taken (Re

Hawkes Hill Publishing Co Ltd; Re Ralls Builders Ltd) but in the present case the circumstances did

not create any reasonable requirement that such advice be sought.

[64] In reaching my views, I have not placed any reliance on the suggestions by the

respondent that there had been an overly aggressive write down of the LLP’s assets and that the

losses in the balance sheet were reduced if deductions for amortisation and depreciation were

added back. Rather, I have proceeded on the basis that the accounts gave the true picture.

[65] In summary, meeting liabilities which are largely to a particular creditor by replacing

them with new liabilities to that creditor, in a continuing and, for the foreseeable future,

unending cycle, is not enough to stop the requirements of section 123(2) being met. The

proposed demerger plans and their implementation do not support a reasonable expectation, at

the material times, of liabilities being met for the purposes of section 123(2). They support the

view that the business may very well continue. Profitability could result, as Shokat Mobarik

intended, but equally the cycle could simply continue, albeit with a reduction in debt. Thus, the

evidence on this part of the test did not give a sufficient basis for concluding that liabilities

[66] However, a reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation is established when

there is no suggestion of that occurring or being likely to be initiated, whether voluntarily or by

any creditor, and there are good reasons why the family members who control and have at all

times financially supported the key businesses wish to avoid such a course. In respect of the

withdrawals made from May 2014, the existence of that reasonable prospect is further and

separately established by the evidence about the demerger and its potential consequences.

[67] Accordingly, a basis for reasonably expecting liabilities in existence at the time of the

withdrawals to be met did not exist. Thus, the limb 2 part of the test which I have to apply is

met. However, on the evidence which I have accepted, a reasonable prospect of avoiding

insolvent liquidation was not shown by the noter to be absent. Rather, it was demonstrated to be

present, on two separates bases (the second of which applied from May 2014). The limb 3 part of

[68] For these reasons, I refuse the prayer of the Note.

Scottish Court of Session Decisions